Charles M Schulz The Philosophy OF Snoopy

In contributing a foreword to this book I am complying with a wish my husband expressed a few days before his death. He had completed the manuscript of this work, which may be considered a companion volume to his book Formal Methods. The task of seeing it through the press was undertaken by Mr. J. J. A. Mooij, acting director of the Institute for Research in Foundations and the Philosophy of Science (Instituut voor Grondslagenonderzoek en Filoso:fie der Exacte Wetenschappen) of the University of Amsterdam, with the help of Mrs. E. M. Barth, lecturer at the Institute. I wish to thank Mr. Mooij and Mrs. Barth most cordially for the care with which they have acquitted themselves of this delicate task and for the speed with which they have brought it to completion. I also wish to express my gratitude to Miss L. E. Minning, M. A. , for the helpful advice she has so kindly given to Mr. Mooij and Mrs. Barth during the proof reading. C. P. C. BETH-PASTOOR VII PREFACE A few years ago Mr. Horace S.

This book offers the first sustained investigation of the phenomenon of retraction - the “taking back” of the conventional or deontic effects of a previous speech act - bringing together issues and solutions from the semantics of perspectival expressions and from the framework of Speech Act theory. It addresses questions that have been at the center of lively debates in philosophy of language and linguistics, but also draws out some of the ramifications these questions have for certain debates in the logic of discourse, philosophy of mind or experimental philosophy.

This book celebrates and explores some philosophical issues raised by the work of Alan Weir, who is Professor Emeritus at the University of Glasgow, having previously held positions at the Universities of Oxford, Edinburgh and Queen’s, Belfast. In a number of areas, Weir has elaborated strikingly original views which involve a radical departure from the mainstream. These include formalism in the philosophy of mathematics, and as well as naïve set theory, with a universal set, and a naïve theory of truth. In contrast to other contemporary defenders of the latter two theories, Weir rejects dialetheism and accepts classical rules for the logical connectives. He avoids contradictions by restricting certain structural inference rules, specifically some generalized versions of transitivity. In addition, Weir has developed radical versions of naturalism and physicalism (partly informed by his work on Quine) and perceptual realism. This collection includes contributions by a distinguished group of philosophers on Weir’s philosophy, as well as a memoir and a new essay on the philosophy of mathematics by Weir himself.