De Finetti

For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view has come to dominate the academic com- nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut- ity and subjective probability should not be de?ned in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects.

In recent years, the discovery of the relationships between formulas in Łukasiewicz logic and rational polyhedra, Chang MV-algebras and lattice-ordered abelian roups, MV-algebraic states and coherent de Finetti’s assessments of continuous events, has changed the study and practice of many-valued logic. This book is intended as an up-to-date monograph on infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic and MV-algebras.